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UNDERSTANDING LEGAL COMPLIANCE
V. Lee Hamilton*
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW. By Tom R. Tyler. New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 273. $30.
Why do people obey the law? In his new book, Tom Tyler argues
against one popular answer to this question: the view that compliance
follows from, and must be justified in terms of, self-interest. This instrumental view of compliance - that people obey the law because it
is in their interest to do so - is found in law and across the social
sciences under such labels as public choice theory, rational choice or
rational actor models, deterrence theories, and theories of learning or
exchange. 1 Tyler's work is a serious challenge to the instrumental
view. Theoretically and empirically, Tyler makes a powerful case that
what he calls normative considerations are central to the public's decisions about compliance. That is, people follow the law because it is
the right thing to do.
The overall normative argument has three key pieces. First, the
book addresses the question of what motivates compliance with law (p.
40). Tyler's answer is that two normative factors, the citizen's personal moral standards and the citizen's sense that the legal demand is
legitimate, dominate decisions about legal compliance (p. 64). He concentrates on legitimacy because it is more readily modifiable by legal
authorities (p. 65). Second, Tyler turns to the determinants of legitimacy (p. 45), including changes in perceived legitimacy that occur in
reaction to experiences with the police or courts (p. 94). Tyler finds
that normative rather than instrumental considerations are most important in shaping the sense that laws or orders ought to be obeyed.
In particular, a crucial determinant of legitimacy is the justice or injustice of the procedures that authorities follow (p. 102). Third, Tyler
examines the components of procedural justice itself. 2 Tyler finds that
the sense that a procedure is fair is primarily derived from noninstrumental factors: aspects of fairness that have nothing to do with outcomes, but instead include such normative concerns as citizens'
opportunities for self-expression (p. 178). Thus, compliance is traced
• Professor, Sociology Department, University of Maryland. B.A. 1970, College of William
& Mary; Ph.D. 1975, Harvard. - Ed.
1. See, e.g.• J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975); D. MUELLER, PUB·
LIC CHOICE (1979).
2. Chs. 9-11. For an overview of recent research on procedural justice by Tyler and others,
see E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
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to such normative considerations as legitimacy; legitimacy, to such
normative issues as procedural fairness; and procedural fairness, to
such normative matters as the citizenry having a voice in decisions
that affect them.
This conclusion offers considerably more hope - and leeway for legal authorities than does a strictly instrumental view of compliance. For example, it indicates that legal authorities can maintain a
considerable reserve of support through hard times if these authorities
can convince their constituents that the rules are being drafted and
administered fairly. And this fairness need not even be a fairness of
outcomes distributed, but a fairness of procedures followed during the
distribution.
These are important issues. Therefore it is essential that we examine closely the nature and potential limits of the empirical evidence
Tyler brings to bear. He carried out a panel study that began with a
random sample of 1575 Chicago residents, interviewed by telephone
for approximately twenty-five minutes in the spring of 1984 (p. 8).
One year later, a random subset of 804 respondents was reinterviewed.
When Tyler examined the effect of actual experiences with the law, the
analyses included only those 652 respondents in the first wave and 291
respondents in the second wave who had what Tyler termed "nonsuperficial" contacts with the police or courts (pp. 12-13). Nonsuperficial contacts were instances of personal contact in which the
respondent had a stake in the outcome (excluding, therefore, experiences such as being a juror) (p. 9). Overall, the book provides a careful account of the sampling decisions, the composition of the sample,
and its limitations.
The data set is unusually rich. Many social scientists have generalized about issues of compliance, legitimacy, and justice from much
narrower samples, such as undergraduate subjects in laboratory experiments. 3 Few social scientists have taken the trouble to use panel data.
A panel - two or more sets of data on the same people - is expensive
to obtain and can be cumbersome to analyze. Panel data, however, are
invaluable in making clear causal inferences when one's variables cannot be manipulated, but can be tracked over time. The effect of a person's experience with the police is a prime example of an issue that
cannot ethically be addressed by experimental methods but lends itself
well to panel analysis.
Despite - or because of - the unusually rich data, the legal
reader may find the data analysis occasionally difficult to digest. Tyler
uses relatively sophisticated techniques. At the extreme, these involve
structural equation models of the panel data, complete with corrections for attenuation due to unreliability of measurement, using the
3. Examples include previous research in procedural justice itself. See E. LIND & T. TYLER,

supra note 2.
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popular LISREL data analysis package.4 Any reader who had difficulty with the preceding sentence will find some of the data analysis
slow going. In some chapters it may be tempting to skip to the discussion, but to do so would miss much of the nuance of the argument,
which is often developed in the analyses themselves. Tyler generally
assesses several alternative interpretations and tests his points in several ways before drawing conclusions.
Perhaps the main point that may not be salient to the nonsocial
scientist in reading about the more complex models Tyler presents is
that the models are theories, not facts. That is, causal models provide
a way of accounting for patterns of interrelationships in the data; they
are not the only way of so accounting. Often a number of alternative
models might "fit" the data in a statistical sense. The biggest dangers
- or largest number of alternative models - involve the panel data,
which are the most complex and are based on the smallest sample
sizes. In sum, the book's great empirical strength is its panel study; at
the same time, the panel analyses are the results most in need of careful replication.
Conceptually, Tyler offers us a heartening vision of the participatory democratic state. In a nutshell, if the authorities are "good
guys," the citizens will be "good citizens," not because they have to
but because they feel they should (p. 178). I am left, however, with a
few questions outstanding: Are there limits on this vision of legitimacy as underlying compliance and procedural justice as underlying
legitimacy? And if so, what are they? I think that Tyler is correct as
regards the importance of normative bases for legal compliance, in
contrast to the instrumental concerns that have dominated recent discussions. 5 Nonetheless, this model may prove to be limited- perhaps
to politically and economically stable modern democracies as Tyler's
own discussion suggests.
Tyler notes that other researchers have found that revolutionary
leaders tend to concentrate their rhetoric on distributive injustices, not
procedural issues (p. 148). If procedure is so important, why should
revolutionaries concentrate on distributive questions? Perhaps situations that inspire revolution are simply situations that are so bad as to
bring distributive questions to the fore. Tyler's argument that authorities can "buy time" with a citizenry by following legitimate procedures
may have its limits. When citizens are too short of potatoes, authorities may lose the ability to "buy time" by allowing free speech about
those potatoes.
4. LISREL stands for linear structural relationships; it is a computer program for solving
structural equations. See K. JORESKOG & D. SORBUM, RELATIONSHIPS BY THE METHOD OP
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD, INsrRUMENTAL VARIABLES, AND LEAST SQUARES METHODS (4th
ed. 1986).
5. For examples, see supra note 1.
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Ultimately, this book provides what may be more important than
answers: new questions. For example, what is the relationship between social/political change writ small, such as the adjustment that
may occur in an individual's sense of legitimacy after an encounter
with legal authorities, and social/political change that is more cataclysmic and collective, such as the social movements that bring down
governments? And what is the linkage of each to a vision, or visions,
of justice? Tyler's work suggests that normative questions are likely to
figure prominently at each level.

